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Orekhova S. V., Kudin L. S. Firm Performance and CEO Influence. Izv. Saratov Univ., Economics. Management. Law, 2020, vol. 20, iss. 2, pp. 158-167. DOI:

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Firm Performance and CEO Influence

Introduction. The evolution of the corporate governance system determines the transition from external to internal development vector. The current research agenda is the search for new mechanisms of Russian corporations’ organizational effectiveness. In this regard, the effectiveness of company management is of particular importance. Theoretical analysis. The article identifies key factors affecting management performance. The central objective of the study is to assess the impact of the CEO turnover on the firm performance. The article clarifies the concept of “firm performance”. Based on the analysis of existing studies, factors affecting management performance, mainly the role of the CEO, are systematized. Empirical analysis. Fixed-effect panel regression is used as the research method. The information base is the data of Russian joint-stock companies for the period from 2006 to 2017. Results. Various specifications of the base model revealed a statistically negative short term connection between the change of revenue and the CEO turnover in Russian joint-stock companies. On the whole, the CEO turnover indirectly influences the effectiveness of management.

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